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PRIVACY, PARTICIPATION AND THE CITY 
Abigail E. Jackson and Julian Sidoli del Ceno 
 
“Privacy is not something I’m entitled to.  It’s an absolute prerequisite.”  Marlon Brando 
“You already have zero privacy.  Get over it!”  Scott McNealey, CEO of Sun Microsystems 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is almost nine o’ clock in the morning.   The Northern Line platform at London Bridge station is crowded 
with commuters, dressed in a uniform of black, grey and brown.  A man in an oversized trench-coat stands 
next to a woman checking her mobile phone, barely acknowledging one another.  Elsewhere, a woman listens 
to music on headphones, while others look at the announcement board in the hope a train will arrive soon.  
Yet, in spite of the crowds, there is silence.  The only sounds are the shuffling of feet and the whirring of an 
approaching train, with the occasional interjection from the station manager telling commuters to “mind the 
gap”.  After a train pulls into the station, the doors open and a line of city workers start to disembark.  Jostling 
against those on the platform, a man’s briefcase hits another’s knees, as they brush past.  On the train itself, 
there is little space for the incomers, but as the doors start to close, a woman leaps into one of the carriages, 
clutching her bag and bending her head forwards to fit into the available space.  The train then pulls away from 
the station with its passengers, ready or not for the next business day at work. 
At first glance, this scene may appear to have little relevance to a chapter about privacy and participation.  
However, as part of our everyday life in the city, we try to achieve a balance between our public persona and 
our private nature.  For to participate in the city, it is necessary to be a “social animal”1, but to be a social 
animal, we must understand ourselves in private first.  As Sennett explained “while man made himself in public, 
he realized his nature in the private realm, above all in his experiences with his family”.2  Today, the city is 
characterised by conflict between the public and the private.  Although the neighbourhood gossip is a 
common stereotype in rural communities, it can still be difficult for an individual to enjoy privacy in an urban 
setting.  Put simply, the city is uncontrollable.  Space is often at a premium and the transient nature of the 
environment may mean that an individual does not even know her own flatmates.  Likewise, technological 
advances which may affect an individual’s privacy are tested and used more regularly in the city, rather than in 
smaller, local communities.  By way of example, in 2013, a marketing company called Renew was criticised for 
embedding sensors in recycling bins in Cheapside in London to monitor the movements of individuals in the 
area.3   
1 Aristotle, Politics, Book One, Loeb Classical Library Volume 264. 
2 Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, 1st edn, Penguin, London 2002, pp.18-19  
3 Joe Miller, ‘City of London calls halt to smartphone tracking bins’, BBC News, 12 August 2013, Retrieved on 24 
March 2016 from www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23665490 
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Returning to our scene of rush hour on the London Underground, it can be seen that we regulate our privacy 
in an urban context through shared codes of behaviour or “rules of civility”.4  There is silence on the Northern 
Line platform on a weekday morning because of a common understanding that if an individual were to speak, 
she may be considered to be invading another’s privacy.  Her physical proximity to others is such that she is 
already far closer to them than is usually acceptable in day-to-day life.  So, for her to speak is to invade 
another’s privacy yet further, and in a way that may be intolerable according to the prevailing rules of civility.  
After all, it may be an intrusion into someone’s private thoughts.  Of course, in another city and at another 
time, this norm may be different.  However, it has become part of London life with little thought or 
consideration by the commuters.   
Using London as a setting and making reference to English law, this chapter aims to provide an insight into 
the contested relationship between privacy and participation.  It will review the discourse surrounding the 
“right to the city” as advocated by Henri Lefebvre5 and David Harvey6, looking at the way in which the 
increasing privatisation of urban space has affected our participation.  It will also analyse how certain rules of 
civility have been incorporated into English law, both through the tort of breach of confidence and legislation 
governing electoral malpractice.  To conclude, it will argue that even though there are real concerns about our 
ability to participate and the use of public space, urban law should take more account of the importance of the 
private sphere and the concept of home.7  For a city to flourish, so too must its citizens, and that requires 
them to have a degree of privacy.   
THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 
Traditional conceptions of rights date back to the eighteenth century, and in particular to Rousseau’s theory of 
the social contract.8  For Rousseau, a government could only have legitimacy in a society where citizens held 
and were able to exercise certain rights, such as the right to vote, the right to move and the right to 
representation.  More recently, however, other notions of rights have emerged, with the introduction of the 
European Convention of Human Rights in the 1950s and Lefebvre’s radical reworking of urban citizenship in 
the 1960s.  Nowadays, Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city has become an evocative call for a renewed 
urban democracy, particularly by those challenging social exclusion.  It can be seen as the counterpoint to the 
“powerless” and bureaucratic model of urban government described by Frug9, as well as the increasing level of 
globalisation affecting our cities.10    For as Lefebvre himself explained: 
4 Robert C. Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’, California Law 
Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, 1989, pp.957-1010   
5 Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, trans Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas, 1st edn, Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford 1996 
6 David Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’, New Left Review, Vol. 53, No. 23, 2008, pp.23-40   
7 Lorna Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies, 1st edn, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006  
8 Jean-Jaques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans Christopher Betts, 1st edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994    
9 Gerald E. Frug, ‘The City as a Legal Concept’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 6, 1980, pp.1057-1154 
10 David Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’, New Left Review, Vol. 53, Sept-Oct 2008, pp.23-40   
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“The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities.    
It can only be formulated as a renewed and transformed right to urban life”.11  
Yet, while the right to the city may have caught both popular and academic interest, there is still a lack of 
clarity as to how it can transform the city, or our understanding of urban participation.  In that regard, this 
chapter aims to provide an insight into the right itself, as well as the challenges it may pose.        
According to Lefebvre, the right to the city has two distinct components, namely appropriation and 
participation.12  With regards to appropriation, Lefebvre argued that individuals create space where they shape 
their lives.13  The nature of that space is necessarily affected by an individual’s class, interests or her 
relationships with others.  Space cannot be seen simply as a geographic form or a product of the built 
environment.  Rather, it is a fluid concept, which is constantly produced and reproduced through the acts of 
individuals.  Take the example of a music festival set in a park.  For weeks before, the organisers may arrange 
for a stage to be built, or allocate areas for camping, stalls and food kiosks, while excluding visitors to the park.  
During the festival itself, the space will be used in the manner envisaged, before being returned to its original 
use as a park.  Moving this notion into an urban context, Lefebvre argued that an individual appropriates space 
by carry out her day-to-day activities, such as living and working in the city.  As such, the city becomes an 
“oeuvre” or a work in which all of the citizens participate.  It can be seen a contrast to the relative stability and 
homogeneity of the rural. 
Turning to the right to participate in the city, this is regarded as being contingent on an individual’s ability to 
appropriate urban space by Lefebvre.  So, it follows that if an individual is able to appropriate urban space, she 
should have the right to determine how that land is used.  In short, she should be able to participate in all 
decisions affecting urban space.  At first, there may seem to be nothing surprising in this aspect of Lefebvre’s 
right to the city.  Yet, it represents a rejection of traditional concepts of enfranchisement and participation.  
More specifically, enfranchisement is no longer based on an individual’s membership of a national political 
community.  Instead, it is concerned with whether she is an urban inhabitant, or “citadin” to use Lefebvre’s 
terminology.   
Likewise, Lefebvre’s notion of participation does not simply refer to an individual’s right to elect government 
officials or vote in a referendum.  To the contrary, he envisaged that citadins should play a central and direct 
role in all decisions affecting urban space, having the “majority and hegemonic voice”.14  In London, for 
example, citadins would be able to participate in decisions about the location of an office block, or a new 
railway station.  However, they would also be able to participate in the decision-making process of other nation 
states that affect the production of space in the city, such as the French government’s decision to demolish a 
11 Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, trans Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas, 1st edn, Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford 1996, p.158 
12 Mark Purcell, ‘Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and it urban politics of the inhabitant’, Geojournal, Vol. 
58, 1991, pp.99-108   
13 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans Donald Nicholson-Smith, 1st edn, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1991 
14 Mark Purcell, ‘Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and it urban politics of the inhabitant’, Geojournal, Vol. 
58, 1991, pp.99-108   
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refugee camp in Calais, known as the “Jungle”.15  Since many of the refugees in the camp were attempting to 
reach the United Kingdom and in particular, London, this decision could have real effect on the production of 
space in the city.   
Despite its initial attractiveness, Lefebvre’s right to the city remains problematic and difficult to define.  Even 
though Lefebvre perceived the right to the city to be transformative, there is little evidence that it would 
operate in this way in practice. 16  Applying his theory, however, the nature of the city would depend on the 
political leanings of its inhabitants at the time the right was invoked.  Take the example of Notting Hill and 
Shepherds Bush in London.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the area was associated with immigration from the 
Caribbean, where individuals would live in poor quality housing that was administered by slum landlords, such 
as Perec Rachman.  If Lefebvre’s right to the city had operated in that area at that time, this could have had a 
real effect on the way in which that part of London developed.  It may have affirmed the rights of the Afro-
Caribbean community against other marginalised groups or more powerful communities.  By contrast, Notting 
Hill is now an affluent neighbourhood, with many of the properties being owned by an international elite.  If 
those inhabitants were to exercise Lefebvre’s right to the city, this would lead to a very different urban 
environment and style of governance.  In this regard, Lefebvre is notably vague about the definition of a city, 
whether it requires a certain population or should include the suburbs.17  Moreover, Lefebvre does not 
consider how the right to the city would operate where two or more cities have an interest in a particular 
measure.  So, returning to our example of the French government’s decision to demolish the “Jungle” refugee 
camp in Calais, it is inevitable that will affect nearby cities, such as Lille and Paris.  If those cities have 
competing interests, it is unclear whose interests will take precedence and how that will be determined.  By way 
of example, would the decision be made by the city where there is the greatest effect on the production of 
space?  Or should it be the city with the largest population?  How can a decision be reached on the production 
of space in the city, when there is no general consensus amongst the citadins?      
Finally, and perhaps in the context of this chapter, most importantly, some commentators have argued that the 
right to the city fails to take proper account of the importance of the private sphere, or the way in which they 
are interrelated.  So, while Lefebvre argued that all citadins had the right to live in the city, he gave little 
thought to housing conditions or the space that an individual required to flourish.  Instead, he simply rejected 
the notion of property rights, denouncing them as part of a “bureaucratic society of urban consumption”.18  
Looking at this matter from a feminist perspective, it should be noted that Lefebvre does not consider how a 
woman’s rights within her home may affect her enjoyment of the city, or the possibility that she may be 
15 Robert Booth, ‘Calais camp demolitions ‘forcing more refugees to make crossing to UK’, The Guardian, 24 March 
2016, Retrieved on 24 March 2016 from www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/24/calais-refugee-camp-
demolitions-increase-uk-asylum-seekers 
16 In his theory, Lefebvre does not address whether any checks and balances are required to prevent citadins from 
introducing exclusionary and discriminatory measures, such as racially restricted covenants. This has led to the 
continued and ongoing residential segregation of certain racial groups in America.  See Kevin Fox Gotham, ‘Urban 
Space, Restrictive Covenants, and the Origin of Racial Residential Segregation in a U.S. City, 1900-1950’, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2000, pp.616-33 
17 Mark Purcell, ‘Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and it urban politics of the inhabitant’, Geojournal, Vol. 
58, 1991, pp.99-108   
18 Mustafa Dikeç, ‘Justice and the spatial imagination’, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 33, 2001, pp.1785-1805 
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excluded from certain public spaces through fear of harassment and unwelcome attention.19  That same 
criticism may be made with regards to certain racial groups, or other disadvantaged members of society, such 
as the disabled and homeless.20  After all, to participate in the city, an individual must have access to a space 
where she can express herself fully and without fear of recrimination.  If she lives in an environment 
controlled by others, be it a home, prison or on the streets, this may not be possible.  
THE PRIVATE CITY OR A PUBLIC SPACE? 
In the context of the debate over the privatisation of urban space, it is notable there has been a growing 
interest in the right to the city, as well as the notion of the “commons”.  In cities across the world, shopping 
malls are being privatised, together with large areas of open space.21  Even shelters in public parks are 
becoming high-end coffee kiosks, serving hot drinks at a price only a few residents can afford.22  As Klein 
commented: 
“There are oppositional threads taking form in many different campaigns and movements.  The spirit 
that they share is a radical reclaiming of the commons.  As our communal spaces disappear – town 
squares, streets, schools, farms, plants – are being displaced by the ballooning marketplace, a spirit of 
resistance is taking hold around the world.  People are reclaiming bits of nature and culture and saying 
‘this is going to be public space’”.23     
If the commons is understood as land or resources that are managed by a community and to which we all have 
access24, it can be seen in housing cooperatives, village greens25 or even informal settlements that have been 
built outside the city.26  Using London as an example, the River Thames can be seen as an urban commons.  
Since the city was established by the Romans, the river has been used by inhabitants for both trade and leisure 
pursuits, while in 1989, the Thames Path was granted the status of being an official National Trail.  As a result 
of this designation, members of the public are able to walk approximately 200 miles from the river’s source in 
the Cotswolds to the Thames Barrier.  However, that right has been curtailed by property developers, who 
have built large residential complexes or apartment blocks by the banks of the river.  This has meant that it is 
increasingly difficult for ramblers to walk along the Thames Path, without passing through private 
19 Tovi Fenster, ‘The Right to the Gendered City:  Different Formations of Belonging in Everyday Life’, Journal of 
Gender Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2005, pp.217-231 
20 Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space, 1st edn, The Guildford Press, New York 
2003 
21 Antonia Layard, ‘Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place’, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2010, 
pp.412-441  
22 Take the example of the Kiosk Café in Bethnal Green Gardens in London.  Until recently, this was a unique Art 
Deco style public shelter, designed by the London Passenger Transport Board architect, Charles Holden.  See 
planning application no. PA/14/02366 from the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.  
23 Naomi Klein, ‘Reclaiming the Commons’, New Left Review, Vol. 9, May-June 2001, pp.81-89 
24 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor’, Social and Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 
3, pp.311-331  
25 s.15 Commons Act 2006 
26 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in 
Pasargada’, Law and Society Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.5-126  
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developments where access is controlled by a security guard or locked gate.27  Once again, this highlights the 
conflict between an individual’s right to enjoy the city and another’s right to privacy.  Put simply, the owner of 
a waterside apartment may wish to exclude members of the public from the space outside her building to 
protect her own quiet enjoyment of the land.  Yet, in doing so, the property owner is limiting the right to the 
city enjoyed by another individual.           
At this juncture, it is perhaps pertinent to consider Gray and Gray’s conception of “quasi-public” property.28  
In terms of land, Gray and Gray have argued that “notions of “public” and “private” operate not 
dichotomously, but continuously across a spectrum in which adjacent connotations shade easily into one 
another”.29  By way of explanation, many of the public services that we use on a regular basis, such as parks, 
libraries and civic buildings, operate on privately owned land, even if the title is held by a local authority or 
government department.  Given the nature of the land and the character of its owner, it is arguable that any 
exclusion from these places could be challenged on proportionality grounds under the Human Rights 1998, 
with the users invoking either Article 8, Article 10 or Article 11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Yet, the complexity of property arrangements in the city mean that disputes over access are rarely so 
simple.  For example, if a local authority had an office in a privately owned building, could the freeholder 
exercise her discretion to refuse entry to certain individuals?  Is it reasonable for the owner of a riverside 
property to impose conditions on when and how part of the Thames Path can be used?  Should the owner of a 
shopping centre be able to exclude members of the public from the property on a permanent and ongoing 
basis for acts of nuisance and anti-social behaviour?   
In fact, the last question was answered in the affirmative by the Court of Appeal in CIN Properties Ltd v. 
Rawlins30.  Although there was an implied permission for members of the public to enter a shopping centre, 
this was an equitable right that could be revoked with immediate effect.31  Moreover, there was no obligation 
on the landowner to act rationally, or consider whether the exclusion was proportionate to the aim that she 
was trying to achieve.  Interestingly, that decision was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Appleby v. United Kingdom32, where a landowner was able to exclude an individual from a shopping mall for 
collecting signatures to protest against a local development.  This did not represent a breach of the applicant’s 
rights to freedom of assembly or expression, and neither could the government be expected to take any 
responsibility for the applicant’s human rights.   
27 Jack Shenker, ‘Privatised London: the Thames Path walk that resembles a prison corridor’, The Guardian, 24 
February 2015, Retrieved on 24 March 2016 from www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/feb/24/private-london-
exposed-thames-path-riverside-walking-route 
28 Kevin J. Gray and Susan F. Gray,’Private Property and Public Propriety’ in ed. Janet McClean, Property and the 
Constitution, 1st edn, Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999; Kevin J. Gray and Susan F. Gray, ‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and 
Quasi-Public Space’, European Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 4, 1999, pp46-102 
29 Kevin J. Gray and Susan F. Gray,’Private Property and Public Propriety’ in ed. Janet McClean, Property and the 
Constitution, 1st edn, Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999 
30 CIN Properties Limited v. Rawlins [1995] 2 EGLR 130 
31 Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M&W 838 
32 Appleby and Others v. United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 222, (2003) 37 EHRR 38 
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More recently, however, there has been a move by the courts towards restricting a landowner’s ability to evict 
individuals from her property.  In a minority opinion in Malik v. Fassenfelt33, Sir Alan Ward held that Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights was engaged where squatters had established a settlement and 
used the property as their home.  As a result, the squatters could only be evicted if the eviction was a legitimate 
means of achieving proportionate aim.  At first glance, this may appear to be an affirmation of the right to the 
city and an individual’s ability to take part in all aspects of urban life.  After all, by allowing an individual to 
remain on another person’s land, she may be able to participate fully in the life of the community as an active 
citizen.  Nevertheless, that decision is necessarily limited.  Referring to the jurisprudence on evictions from 
social housing34, Sir Alan Ward accepted that the circumstances that would prevent the eviction of a squatter 
or an occupier would have to be “exceptional”.  Indeed, it is difficult to envisage a case where the squatter’s 
rights would take precedence over those of the owner.  Further, it fails to take account of other legislation, 
which may exclude an individual from certain parts of the city.  For instance, under the Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014, a local authority is able to obtain an “injunction to prevent nuisance and 
annoyance” against an individual whose behaviour is likely to cause alarm, harassment or distress, for what 
could be an indefinite period of time.  Had that law been in force at the time of the judgment in CIN Properties 
Ltd v. Rawlins35, the young men may have found themselves subject to such an injunction that permanently 
excluded them from the shopping centre in question.  In short, although the law that is used may be different, 
the consequences remain the same.   
As we have seen before, the right to the city demands the right to use urban space, both for an individual’s 
day-to-day activities and her participation in political life.  In other words, a citadin needs to have a space 
where her voice can be heard without any undue restrictions, as well as gain access to the political process.36  
Nevertheless, a balance needs to be struck between our right to public space and private property rights.  
Writing on the plight of the homelessness, Waldron explains: 
“there is no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to be whenever he chooses, 
no place governed by a private property rule from which he may not at any time be excluded as a 
result of someone else's say-so”.37  
Put simply, a person who is homeless has nowhere to carry out her private functions, such as cooking, 
washing, sleeping and eating.  She is allowed to live on the streets or under bridges, but only in the manner that 
society allows her to do so.  Extrapolating Waldron’s argument further, the same problem could arise if all land 
was common or publicly held.  For instance, where in a warzone or a dystopian wasteland could an individual 
go to carry out her daily routine, without any unnecessary interference from others?  Once again, she may be 
allowed to live in a refugee camp or a deserted building, but only in the manner that society allows her to do 
33 Malik v. Fassenfelt [2013] EWCA Civ 798 
34 Manchester City Council v. Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2010] 3 WLR 1441; London Borough of Hounslow v. Powell [2011] 
UKSC 8 
35 CIN Properties Limited v. Rawlins [1995] 2 EGLR 130 
36 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The public sphere: An encyclopaedia article’, New German Critique, Vol. 3, Autumn 1974, pp.49-
55 
37 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Homelessness and Freedom’, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37, 1991-1992, pp.295-324   
7 
 
                                                          
so.  In these circumstances, it is necessary for us to examine the notion of privacy and how that can be 
achieved in the city, both through property rights and other laws.  For the private sphere is not only where an 
individual lives the most intimate part of her life, but it is also the place in which she develops her ideas and 
associations with others.  It is the place where an individual becomes a fully developed citadin.    
IDEAS AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF PRIVACY 
As a legal concept, privacy is notoriously difficult to define.  Traditionally seen as “the right to be let alone”38, 
it has more recently been described by Solove as a “relief from social friction.  It enables people to engage in 
worthwhile activities that they would otherwise find impossible”.39  In England and Wales, the courts have 
refused to recognise a general right to privacy.40 Yet, notions of privacy are present elsewhere in the law.  Take 
landlord and tenant law for example.  It is almost a truism that every residential tenancy agreement contains 
the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.41  This allows a tenant to use the rental property without any 
unreasonable interference from others, and in particular, her landlord.  If a landlord enters a property without 
the tenant’s consent or cuts off any essential services, this will be deemed to be a breach of contract and 
possibly even a criminal offence.42  Meanwhile, harassment is a criminal offence43, as is sending grossly 
offensive, indecent or obscene messages.44  There is also legislation governing the dissemination of personal 
information45 and perhaps, most importantly, a restitutionary claim for breach of confidence has been 
developed.46      
Nevertheless, even though privacy has been described as a concept in “disarray”47, there is often something 
instinctive about any breach.  From a young age, we are able to recognise when there has been an unacceptable 
intrusion into our personal space, be it a parent entering a bedroom or teacher looking at messages on a 
student’s mobile phone.  We can also identify when another person’s right to privacy has been breached.  So, 
for instance, most individuals would agree that a woman’s privacy has been invaded if she sees a peeping tom 
at the window, or finds an embarrassing photograph has been published in the press without her consent.  The 
common theme in these examples is that others were involved, and have behaved towards us in a manner that 
we consider to be unacceptable.  As such, privacy can be seen as a set of social norms that govern our 
relationships with others, and regulate any interactions.48   To that end, there may be little need for privacy 
38 Thomas Cooley, Cooley on Torts, 2nd ed, 1888, p.29 
39 Daniel J. Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 154, No. 3, 2008, pp.477-560   
40 Kaye v. Robertson [1990] EWCA Civ 21; [1991] FSR 62.  This position was later affirmed in Wainwright v. Home Office 
[2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 
41 Jenkins v. Jackson [1888] 40 Ch. D. 71.  See also Kenny v. Preen [1963] 1 QB 499; [1962] EWCA Civ 2; [1962] 3 WLR 
1233; [1962] 3 All ER 814 
42 s.5 Protection from Eviction Act 1977  
43 s.2 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
44 s.127 Communications Act 2003 
45 Data Protection Act 1998 
46 Douglas v. Hello! [2001] 2 WLR 992 
47 Daniel J. Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 154, No. 3, 2008, pp.477-560   
48 Robert C. Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’, California 
Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp.957-1010  
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laws on a deserted island with only one or two inhabitants, but by way of contrast, the privacy of a citadin is 
likely to be challenged on a day-to-day basis, in view of the large, diverse and transient population of the city.  
PRIVACY IN THE CITY 
To understand how privacy operates in the city, it is necessary for us to examine how the law strikes a balance 
between an individual’s right to be let alone, and the rights of others to freedom of expression and assembly.  
Often, these cases can be difficult and fact-dependent.  Nevertheless, in part, that can be explained by the 
contradictory nature of an individual herself.  On one hand, she may have a desire to be part of a community, 
but at the same time, she may wish for privacy.   In her study of social ordering in four urban neighbourhoods, 
Merry observed such a contradiction in how middle-class Americans perceive society.49  Individuals would 
often express a desire to have distance from their neighbours, but if there was any anti-social behaviour, they 
would look to the police for assistance.  Even though Merry’s study is over twenty years old, the conflict 
between an individual’s need for privacy and community continues to exist.  Indeed, it has become even more 
contested, given that the population of towns and cities is ever-increasing and space is more limited.  
Despite the continued challenges to an individual’s privacy, the English courts have failed to regulate our 
interactions with others in urban life adequately.  Although the character of the neighbourhood may be a 
factor in determining whether certain conduct amounts to a nuisance50, this only discriminates in favour of 
individuals living in the countryside, to the detriment of those in the city.  More specifically, the law will not 
offer an individual any protection against her neighbour’s reasonable use of land, even if it has a real and 
lasting effect on her wellbeing.   In short, we must tolerate what our neighbours do, even if that hurts us.  In 
Southwark Borough Council v. Mills51, for example, the House of Lords expressed sympathy for a tenant living in 
the inner city, who could hear “not only the neighbours' televisions and their babies crying but their coming 
and going, their cooking and cleaning, their quarrels and their love-making”.52  However, she had no claim in 
nuisance for the reasonable daily activities of those living nearby.  As a citadin, she was expected to know that 
she may have to endure the behaviour of her neighbours, before taking up residence in the apartment.   
To that end, it is notable that many of the laws governing privacy in England and Wales apply an objective 
test, looking at the breach from the perspective of the “reasonable man” or “the man on the Clapham 
omnibus”.53  As Post argued, such a test can be seen as an extrapolation of the community’s moral judgment 
on whether certain behaviour is acceptable, or if it is an invasion of privacy.54  Yet, there may be particular 
issues with placing the reasonable man in the context of the city.  By its very nature, the city is diverse in terms 
of age, culture, religion and ethnic background.  In London, for instance, is the reasonable man a bearded 
hipster, city worker or lifelong resident?  In addition, the use of an objective test means that little consideration 
49 Sally E. Merry, “Mending Walls and Building Fences: Constructing the Private Neighbourhood’, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism, Vol. 33, 1993, pp.71-91 
50 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852 
51 Southwark Borough Council v. Mills [1999] UKHL 40; [1999] 4 All ER 449; [1999] 3 WLR 939 
52 Lord Hoffman in Southwark Borough Council v. Mills [1999] UKHL 40; [1999] 4 All ER 449; [1999] 3 WLR 939 
53  Sir Richard Henn Collins MR in McQuire v. Western Morning News [1903] 2 KB 100 (CA)  
54 Robert C. Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’, California 
Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp.957-1010 
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is given to the way in which an individual’s surroundings affect her behaviour towards others.  That is to say, 
the conduct of the reasonable man is not considered from a spatial perspective.  Rather, he is deemed to be a 
“legal fiction”, which arises by the application of an impersonal standard.55  Taking into account the above 
considerations, the objective standard may be better seen as the moral judgement of a small number of 
individuals within the legal system, rather than as reflective of the interests of those living in the city.  Against 
that background, this chapter will conclude by examining two instances where the courts has attempted to 
balance privacy and our right to participate in the city. 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN A PRIVATE LIFE 
Ever since lawyers have contemplated an action for breach of privacy, there has been a debate over the level of 
privacy that should be enjoyed by an individual in public life.  As Warren and Brandeis explained:  
“The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no 
legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all 
persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having matters which they may properly prefer to 
keep private, made public against their will. It is the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which 
is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented”.56 
So, for instance, to establish a claim for breach of confidence in England and Wales, a claimant must 
demonstrate that the information in question is private, and that the interests in keeping it private outweigh 
those in favour of publication.57  Further, in deciding whether to allow publication, the judge will consider 
whether an individual is performing an official function, or is simply in the public eye.  Using that analysis, the 
courts have allowed personal information to be published about Sir Fred Goodwin, the former Chief 
Executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland58, and Boris Johnson, a prominent Conservative politician.59 
Looking at this matter in the context of privacy and urban participation, a number of questions still remain.  
By way of example, what protection should be afforded to an individual who participates in the political life of 
the city, but to a lesser degree, such as a local councillor or an elected police commissioner?  Likewise, the city 
contains a number of organisations that carry out a public function, but are run by private enterprises, such as 
housing associations and academy schools.  How much privacy should the headmaster of such a school enjoy?  
Is there a legitimate public interest in the behaviour of a chief executive of a housing association, if he has 
acted recklessly in his private life?   
Returning to Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the city, it could be argued that all of these individuals make 
decisions that affect the production of urban space.  Therefore, any relevant information about their private 
lives should be disclosed.  Put simply, it affects a citadin’s participation in the city, as well as any decisions she 
makes.  Nevertheless, that fails to address how the publication of private information may affect the wellbeing 
55 Healthcare at Home Limited v. The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49 
56 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5, 1890, pp.193-
220 
57 McKennitt v. Ash [2008] QB 73 
58 Goodwin v. News Group Newspapers Limited (No. 3) [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB) 
59 AAA v. Associated Newspapers Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 554 
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of an individual and her family.  It could deter her from participating fully in urban life, or even from carrying 
out her usual daily activities.  More importantly, however, there is a risk that this could deter other members of 
the community from participating in the city, particularly women or those from minority groups.60  For the 
city to operate effectively, there needs to be participation at grass-roots level and across all ages, races, genders 
and cultures.  Without this, the interests of certain groups of citadins will not be represented adequately or at 
all. 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN A PRIVATE DECISION                  
Aside from claims for breach of confidence, the law governing the conduct of elections regulates privacy and 
participation in the city, both through domestic legislation in the Representation of the People Act 1983 and 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  Although it is a qualified right61, Article 1, Protocol 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides that elections shall be held at regular intervals and by secret 
ballot, under conditions which ensure the free expression of members of the public.  Of course, if an election 
is not conducted properly, it cannot be said to be democratic or represent the will of the people.  In that 
regard, there are obligations on the candidates and their supporters, as well as public officials62, the returning 
officer63, broadcasters64 and the police.65  By way of example, it is an illegal practice to publish any false 
statement about a candidate’s personal character or conduct, unless the publisher has reasonable grounds for 
believing it to be true.  Likewise, it is a criminal offence to procure votes in exchange for money, a financial 
benefit66 or hospitality.67 
In recent years and in particular, under the Blair Government, there has been a move towards the devolution 
of power to regional governments and local authorities, with the London Assembly and the elected position of 
Mayor of London being established in the Greater London Authority Act 1999.  Further, the Local 
Government Act 2000 gave local authorities the ability to adopt a governance structure with a directly elected 
mayor, if that was approved by the electorate in a referendum.  As a consequence, this has renewed interest in 
local democracy, but it has also meant that elections are bitterly fought between different interest groups, each 
seeking control of the authority in question.  Given the contested nature of the city, these developments have 
proved to be problematic in London, and nowhere more so than in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.  
The London Borough of Tower Hamlets can perhaps be best described as one of the most diverse and heavily 
60 Shalailah Medhora, ‘Julia Gillard backlash puts woman with traditional gender beliefs off politics – study’, The 
Guardian, 13 January 2015, Retrieved on 26 March 2016 from www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/13/julia-
gillard-backlash-puts-women-with-traditional-gender-beliefs-off-politics-study; George Eaton, ‘Why Chukka 
Umunna withdrew from the Labour leadership race’, New Statesman, 15 May 2015, Retrieved on 26 March 2016 from  
www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/05/why-chuka-umunna-withdrew-labour-leadership-race 
61 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) 19 BHRC 546, (2006) 42 EHRR 41, [2006] 1 Prison LR 220, 42 EHRR 41, [2005] 
ECHR 681 
62 s.99 Representation of the People Act 1983  
63 s.28 Representation of the People Act 1983 
64 s.93 Representation of the People Act 1983  
65 s.100 Representation of the People Act 1983 
66 s.113 Representation of the People Act 1983 
67 s.114 Representation of the People Act 1983 
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populated areas of London.  At one time, the borough had a reputation for poverty and crime68, with an 
underlying narrative of “waves of foreign immigration”69, dating back to the arrival of French Huguenots in 
the seventeenth century.  Nowadays, there are still areas of real deprivation, but it is also home to the Tower of 
London, Canary Wharf, Spitalfields Market and Brick Lane.  Moreover, Tower Hamlets has had a history of 
electoral problems, as well as political conflicts with central Government.70  So, perhaps it is pertinent to 
examine the most recent judgment involving electoral malpractice in the borough, namely Erlam v. Rahman.71 
The judgment in Erlam v. Rahman concerned a petition by four voters in the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets, alleging that the election of Lutfur Rahman as Mayor in 2014 should be set aside on the basis of 
corrupt and illegal practices.72  The petition contained numerous instances of alleged electoral malpractice, 
including personation, treating, bribery, making unlawful payments to canvassers, tampering with ballot papers 
and misleading voters as to the political affiliation of Mr Rahman.  Most importantly, however, the petition 
alleged that there had been undue influence on the part of Mr Rahman and his supporters, involving both 
spiritual injury and intimidation at polling stations.   
With regards to the allegation of intimidation at polling stations, the petitioners adduced evidence of voters 
being harassed by the jeering and cat-calling of Mr Rahman’s supporters.  Some spoke of having to “run the 
gauntlet” into the polling station.  One woman even told the court that Mr Rahman’s supporters besieged her 
car, banging on its windows with leaflets from his campaign.73  Arguably, this demonstrates that proper 
consideration should be given to both the spatial and temporal aspects of our participation in the city, as well 
as the privacy that requires.  As Zick has claimed, many accounts of participation fail to address the 
importance of place.74  In part, the conduct of Mr Rahman’s supporters was objectionable because they were 
based at the polling station on an election day.  Had this campaigning taken place in a different place or on a 
different day, an individual may not have felt intimated by the supporters’ behaviour, or obligated to vote in a 
certain way.  On an election day, an individual needs to have privacy to be able to cast her vote freely, but a 
candidate’s supporters may wish to canvass at every opportunity.  As a result, participation in urban life can 
lead to greater and ever-increasing challenges to privacy.  To that end, it is notable that when the mayoral 
election was re-run in Tower Hamlets in 2015, there was a greater police presence at polling stations.75  In 
addition, zoning was used to protect voters from unreasonable interference by candidates and their supporters 
in a manner that was reminiscent of the “bubbles” surrounding abortion clinics in the USA.76 
68 Arthur Morrison, Tales of the Mean Streets, 1st edn, Methuen & Co, London 1894; Arthur Morrison, A Child of the 
Jago, 1st edn, Methuen & Co, London 1896; Sarah Wise, The Blackest Streets: The Life and Death of a Victorian Slum, 1st 
edn, Vintage, London 2009 
69 Spitalfields, Spitalfields History, Retrieved on 24 March 2016 from www.spitalfields.co.uk/spitalfields-history 
70 Erlam v. Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215, pp.56-57 
71 Erlam v. Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215 
72 s.158 Representation for the People Act 1983  
73 Erlam v. Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215, pp.178 
74 Timothy Zick, ‘Speech and Spatial Tactics’, Texas Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, 2006, pp.581-651 
75 Catherine Neilan, ‘Tower Hamlets mayoral election: Police will be monitoring voting tomorrow to curb 
“fraudulent activity”’, City A.M., 10 June 2015, Retrieved on 24 March 2016 from  www.cityam.com/217626/tower-
hamlets-mayoral-election-police-will-be-monitoring-voting-tomorrow-curb-fraudulent 
76 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center Inc., 512 US 753 (1994) 
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 A Canvassing Exclusion Zone, Ben Johnson Primary School in London, 11 June 2015  
 
Turning to the allegation of undue spiritual injury, the election commissioner summarised the petitioners’ case 
in the following terms:  
“Mr Rahman… was determined to play the religious card.  The campaign would be targeted at Tower 
Hamlets’ Muslim population with a stark message.  Islam is under threat: it is the duty of all devout 
Muslims to vote for Mr Rahman and his party”.77 
In support of that allegation, the petitioners cited two occasions during the election campaign where Mr 
Rahman had shared a platform with Mr Hoque, the Chairman of the Council of Mosques.  From a video and a 
contemporaneous newspaper article that was written by one of Mr Rahman’s supporters, it was evident that 
Mr Hoque enthusiastically endorsed Mr Rahman’s candidature, and had encouraged voters to elect him as 
Mayor of Tower Hamlets.  Further, a letter was sent to a local Bangladeshi newspaper, the Weekly Desh, by 
101 Muslim clerics and scholars, in support of Mr Rahman.  Rightly or wrongly, the election commissioner 
characterised this letter as a call by influential religious leaders to the faithful, informing them that it was their 
duty to vote for Mr Rahman. 
At first glance, this allegation may appear to have little relevance to an individual’s privacy in the city.  Yet, 
there are certain private matters that are so fundamental to ourselves and our personhood that to refer to them 
77 Erlam v. Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215, pp.160 
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in an election campaign could be seen as unfair and even undemocratic.  Take the example of a candidate who 
threatens to assault a voter, if she fails to cast her vote in a certain way.  That is a simple case where an 
individual is unable to exercise her democratic right for fear of harm.  By way of analogy, is there any real 
difference if a voter is told that it is her religious duty to elect a certain candidate?  If she is devout in her 
religion, she may believe that any failure to comply with the teachings of a religious leader could lead to grave 
consequences.  To argue otherwise is to fail to take account of the strength of an individual’s religious beliefs.  
However, it is that same devoutness that may encourage an individual to participate in the city.  Indeed, 
supporters of Mr Rahman have argued that the judgment could be regarded as being discriminatory and even 
racist.78  They may contend that by placing restrictions on the content of a candidate’s election campaign, the 
law does not adequately consider the interests of different communities or the way in which they may wish to 
participate in the city.  Given these competing interests, it may be appropriate to consider urban participation 
from a utilitarian perspective.  In other words, participation in the city should be regulated in such a way that 
the greatest number of citadins are able to take part in urban life with as few restrictions as possible, so long as 
the privacy of others is respected.  Here, it is notable that in Erlam v. Rahman79, the election court that there 
was no undue intimidation at polling stations, even though the conduct of Mr Rahman’s supporters may have 
been unacceptable to some voters.     
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To summarise, it is difficult to see how a consensus can be reached as to the balance that should be struck 
between an individual’s right to privacy and her ability to participate in urban life.  Such a conflict is inherent in 
the contested nature of the city, as well as the wider incongruity between social capital and diversity.80  One 
approach, however, may be to view the relationship between privacy and participation as the operation of a 
social norm.  As such, this necessarily depends on the nature of the city itself, as well as the expectations of its 
citadins and any shared codes of behaviour.  Returning to our original example of the London Underground, 
there is an implicit understanding amongst commuters that a train journey during rush hour may involve 
physical intrusions in the personal space of others.  To prevent further intrusion into an individual’s private 
space, there is silence.  Of course, that conduct is a social norm, and may be particular to London.  It may not 
be replicated on the Paris Metro, New York Subway or Berlin U-Bahn.        
Nevertheless, there is still a circularity to the arguments surrounding both privacy and participation.  Put 
simply, an individual should be encouraged to participate in all aspects of city life, and that requires the wider 
community to respect her privacy.  Yet, to participate, an individual must relinquish certain aspects of her right 
to a private life and accept that her acts may intrude on the privacy of others.  Perhaps this circularity is why 
the conflict between privacy and urban participation has not been considered in greater detail in the academic 
78 Nadine El-Enany, ‘Why Muslims Can’t Trust the Legal System: The Lutfur Rahman Judgment And Institutional 
Racism’, Critical Legal Thinking, 16 May 2015, Retrieved on 24 March 2016 from 
www.criticallegalthinking.com/2015/05/16/why-muslims-cant-trust-the-legal-system 
79 Erlam v. Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215 
80 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster, New York 
2000; Stephanie Stern, ‘The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property’, Virginia Law 
Review, Vol. 99, pp.811-877 
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literature.  Even so, without privacy or a private space, an interest group would not be able to organise its 
members.  An individual would not be able to develop her sense of self in a way that allows her to participate 
in public life.  The city has been developed both through privacy and participation, and that should be given 
due consideration in any account of urban law.           
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